On 2 Feb 2004 at 21:37, Gary Richmond wrote: (01)
> Peter P. Jones wrote:
>
> >. . .It does get rather tricky when two proponents each believe they
> >have sound reasons for believing that the other's theory is
> >defeasible, and perhaps there are places in the system of reason
> >where such standoffs are always possible, because different agents
> >will always have discrepancies between their situated justification
> >sets grounding justified beliefs.
> >
> So, Peter, I guess one had best be true to at least himself.
>
> OK, I promise that this is my final Peirce quote of the week,
> but I think for me it's a little bit like this (at least I hope that
> it is):
>
> > Peirce: CP 7.595
> > Each man has his own peculiar character. It enters into all he
> > does. It is in his consciousness and not a mere mechanical trick,
> > and therefore it is [ . . . an idea] cognition; but as it enters
> > into all his cognition, it is [an idea] of things in general. It is
> > therefore the man's philosophy, his way of regarding things; not a
> > philosophy of the head alone -- but one which pervades the whole
> > man. This idiosyncrasy is the idea of the man; and if this idea is
> > true he lives forever; if false, his individual soul has but a
> > contingent existence.
>
> That's about as *mystical* as this very scientific man, Peirce, ever
> gets.
It's the use of the word 'idea' and the notion that it is also soul.
The quote above is very reminiscent of Schopenhauer's approach to
Forms [Ideas] and a man's character. Though S. restricted the Idea to
informing character, if recollection serves me (at least in WWR). I'm
not sure if he ever pushed it towards the fuller notion of eternal
soul.
I'm intrigued by CSP using the word soul there, even in connection
with the words 'contingent existence'. (02)
> You also wrote:
>
> >[PJ] Is it possible to experience unique grounds for belief that
> >cannot be communicated, I wonder? An aggregate of perceptual nuances,
> >or an abnormal talent, perhaps.
> >
> >
> My sense is it is not so possible, except perhaps in the realm of
> religion, or art, or aesthetics--in the ordinary sense :-)
> Otherwise I think we need each other as correctives to each other, and
> this is how I think of and teach critical thinking, as akin to
> experimental method, where we throw out our best ideas and see if they
> seem reasonable to the group. (For example, in a collaboratory I hope
> that the group will agree to experiment with my *hypothesis*, actually
> test it in a real world situation.)
I wonder... By which I mean, if so little of the information we
actually take in gets turned into articulated beliefs, is
'corrective' the right [sic] way to look at it?
I would think it good for teaching purposes, but as a philosophical
approach it seems unsophisticated to me not to worry about what
occurs at the dark side of the margins of articulation, if the
idiosyncratic idea of a person informs such matters - especially for
inquiry.
'Intersubjectively acceptable' seems then like an attentuation of a
broader set of possible truths. If that is so, then accepting the
existence of that broader set would seem more humane - and utility
may yet be better served by it too.
That is, Science turns on demonstration, but what if missing the
grounds for certain aspects of theory alters what it is thought
possible to demonstrate. Investigation of that sounds like the way
Science operates, yet what is occurring at the margins of
articulation seems to depend on undemonstrables - the idea of person -
insofar as we can't share consciousness. (03)
Am I talking nonsense? (04)
Cheers,
--
Peter (05)
>
> Gary
>
> >
> >
> >
>
>
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> (06)
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